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ABSTRACT

Failures caused by electrostatic discharge (ESD) compromise the reliability of
embedded systems. Peripherals such as the universal serial bus (USB) are particularly
vulnerable, as isolating them to avoid electromagnetic interference would defy their
purpose - facilitating communication with and/or by the embedded system. Better
understanding the propagation of failures that result from ESD can facilitate defensive
development of hardware and software for embedded systems, but is hampered by the
lack of non-invasive and lightweight instrumentation techniques.
The original contribution of this thesis is the design and development of softwarebased instrumentation for monitoring the reaction of the USB peripheral of an embedded system to ESD. This thesis describes eﬀorts towards detection and root cause
analysis of ESD-induced failures - correlating changes in the operation of the peripheral with the speciﬁc pin subjected to ESD. The work described is intended as
proof-of-concept for the development and use of (in situ) software instrumentation for
lightweight acquisition of data that can be used for runtime failure analysis and actuation of self-healing mechanisms, as well as assessment, modeling, and prediction of
system reliability, availability, and survivability.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Advances in technology have both increased the complexity and reduced the
form factor of electronic devices. The close proximity of components to each other
increases the potential for interference from within the system. Compounding this
eﬀect is interference from the environment, especially electrostatic discharge (ESD),
which is likely to cause system failure. In modern devices, ﬁner wires are used with
closer coupling, and a smaller diﬀerence in potential energy can cause “shocks” or
interference events. Resulting faults can vary from obvious latch-ups to data line faults
that are much harder to detect. The increasing prevalence of and demand for touch
screens and communication ports eliminate the possibility of shielding a system from
external interactions. Connections are required for chargers, audio cables, video cables,
and even new features like ﬁngerprint reader utilized in user authentication. Each
connection increases the vulnerability of the system to interference, and the ability to
monitor the health of the system during these interference events could considerably
shorten debugging cycles and accelerate product release.
Traditional instrumentation techniques, most of which are hardware-based, have
limited success in detecting and monitoring ESD eﬀects. Physical observations can be
made in extreme cases, when considerable interference occurs and either the device
crashes or lines fail. Reduction in size and increase in complexity of devices signiﬁcantly
complicates determination of the root cause of failure, particularly in the development
of hardware instrumentation for gathering data on a system’s operation [1].
The eﬀects of ESD are more complex, reaching beyond the scope of hardware
instrumentation that misses important information related to the software failures
and data corruption that often occur. Rapid data propagation through an embedded
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system often makes it impossible for human observation alone to detect every resulting
parameter change. The inability to observe internal indicators of the state of a system
hinders fault detection. Further exacerbating the problem is that side eﬀects of faults
may manifest after a delay - the system may appear to operate normally in the interim,
complicating the determination of the time of failure.
Hardware instrumentation is typically invasive and increases the system footprint, which makes its use infeasible and/or ineﬃcient for monitoring of mobile systems.
Lightweight software-based instrumentation that monitors a system with minimal overhead or other impact on its operation is a promising solution to the aforementioned
challenges. Software instrumentation can monitor the state of a system at a resolution
much higher than what is possible with hardware, and can be embedded in systems for
continual monitoring in ﬁeld (vs. laboratory) environments, as the system is in use.
This thesis proposes the development of novel software-based instrumentation
for non-intrusive monitoring of the eﬀects of electrostatic discharge on embedded systems. Portability was a guiding principle in the design and development of the proposed
instrumentation. As initial proof-of-concept, instrumentation was developed for monitoring the secure digital (SD) reader peripheral. The original research contribution of
this thesis is design and development of software-based instrumentation for the USB
host controller. Ongoing work is investigating generalization of the implementation to
additional peripherals and platforms.
Two publications have thus far resulted from the work described in this thesis:
1. A. Sabatini, N. Jarus, P. Maheshwari, and S. Sedigh, “Software instrumentation
for failure analysis of USB host controllers,” in Proc. of the IEEE International
Instrumentation and Measurement Technology Conference (I2MTC), pp. 1109114, 2013.

3

2. Sabatini, A.; Jarus, N.; Maheshwari, P.; Sedigh, S., “Software-Based Instrumentation for Analysis of Electrostatic Discharge Eﬀects,” to be submitted to the
IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement.
The ﬁrst publication described the overall methodology and presented preliminary test results. The second publication articulates reﬁnements to the instrumentation
in terms of the type and resolution of data collected, and illustrates analysis of this
data in prediction of whether a given state of the system is aﬀected by ESD. To date,
this technique has a 90% accuracy rate in prediction.
The remainder of this thesis is organized into the following four sections. Section
2. is a literature review of this work deemed most relevant to this study. Section 3. describes the proposed instrumentation and monitoring methodology. Section 4. presents
analysis of the data collected. Finally, Section 5. both concludes this discussion and
suggests further research.
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2.

RELATED WORK

The design methodology for system monitoring will typically fall into one of
three categories: hardware-based, software-based, or a hybrid of the two. Independent
of the category, successful methods are those with low overhead, low cost, high accuracy,
survivability (the ability to continue monitoring despite failures), and high resolution.
This section presents representative techniques from each category and positions our
instrumentation in the context of related work.
Hardware-based techniques prove to be the most common of the methods used.
The general hardware-based approach involves subjecting a system to both electric (E)
and magnetic (H) ﬁelds while observing either the system- or the chip-level reaction.
The goal in doing so is to identify any resulting faults [2–4]. Hardware-based techniques
collect useful information, at high cost. The equipment required to scan the system is
expensive, making the use of the tools ineﬀective when testing end-user devices.
Laouamri and Aktouf demonstrated the use of hardware to monitor a network
in [5]. Network complexity was cited as the main challenge. The proposed solution
was the use of network layer protocol wrappers to monitor the network down to the
integrated circuit (IC) level. IP cores of embedded devices can be monitored using this
technique.
Lim et al. demonstrated the use of sensitivity scanning as a tool for ESD analysis
- speciﬁcally, to determine the susceptibility of an (IC) [6]. Identiﬁcation of sensitive
points can then be the focus for designing improvements into the circuit to avoid hard
errors and faults in the system due to noise-related issues. The monitor itself is limited
to either loss of a signal or a system reset, and cannot observe all soft-errors. This
limitation leads to diﬃculty interpreting the immunity results [7].
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Commercial Oﬀ The Shelf (COTS) peripherals, such as ﬂash drives and memory
cards, introduce a number of potential errors when they are connected to a system. The
unpredictability of COTS peripherals increases the threat of errors during the operation
of real-time systems. Pellizzoni implemented a tool to monitor the peripheral bus in
hopes of formally verifying COTS component functionality [8]. Their tool, BusMOP,
was tested with a COTS data acquisition board [8]. This technique requires an external
device that connects to the peripheral bus to observe communication. The beneﬁt of
BusMOP is that it enables the system to run normally without added overhead.
Zaitcev [9] explored tracing of the Linux kernel. Modern platforms incorporate native software tools to provide on-chip tracing [9]. Other COTS tools can be
used for proﬁling and software instrumentation, though they are limited to particular
processors. Fogarty [11] provided an architectural solution for software instrumentation [10]. This solution uses additional hardware to support the testing software.
Similarly, Buechner [11] attempted to create traces using events, recording the entire
path of the data traveling through the system.
Software monitoring techniques require that overhead be added to applications
that are currently running on the system being tested. This overhead can cause the
system to run less eﬃciently which in turn, causes additional errors to occur. High
Conﬁdence Software Monitoring (HCSM) is a technique used to monitor software with
bounded overhead that achieves high conﬁdence in the served error rates [12]. The
HCSM-based instrumentation tool is attached to the API of the system. Modiﬁcations
of the target overhead level were tested to observe the correlation with the level of
conﬁdence [12]. For proof of concepts, the authors tested the technique on both a web
server and special-purpose micro-benchmarks.
In the software instrumentation approach, either additional code or software
markers are typically inserted into a program during run-time to facilitate the collection of very useful low-level information. In order to collect the information the
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system pays at the cost of the additional clock cycle(s) in order to execute the software
markers. Software techniques that perform hardware monitoring have been previously
investigated [13–15]. Here the software data obtained from the system is used to debug,
make decision for improvements, and in general increase system performance [16, 17].
Software instrumentation studies has been used to predict EMI interference [1].
Yuan [1] used an interrupt-based mechanism to detect PLL lock time variations under
stress. In another study, Yuan modiﬁed the instruction set to predict the EMI behavior
of the operating system. Software hardening techniques were then presented to increase
system reliability [18, 19].
During the design process, various software tools can be used to detect potential
layout faults that can cause parasitic current paths [20]. This could easily be slightly
modiﬁed to be used post production of a product given the needed information. More
commonly, hardware monitors for microcontrollers that are included in software are
some type of watchdog timer. These monitors will detect abnormalities in the system’s
operation and then trigger a system reset [21]. An advanced veriﬁcation unit (presented
in [22]) allows Reinbacher to monitor a bus and then take action in response to the
abnormal behavior. Liu [23] presented a monitor that can be used to detect events
to record memory usage. Unfortunately, this type of work provides little information
about the errors and needs additional hardware modiﬁcations [24].
The work in this thesis uses the knowledge gained from previous work to develop
a unique tool that successfully monitors information from the system under test. The
work presented here applies lessons learned in developing scripts whose lean design
both increases the reliability and decreases the overhead associated with monitoring.
Scalability to additional peripherals and generalization to other platforms were key
concerns throughout the design and development of the monitoring process.
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3.

APPROACH

This section explains the overall goal of the remainder of the dissertation by
presenting the modeling and analysis of the work conducted. The analysis will be
conducted on logs that record register values related to the peripheral under stress, the
USB host controller. The recorded information will be used to determine when bits
in the stream are ﬂipped, changes in the register values, timing issues, and possible
corruption of data. The board that will be used for the testing can be seen in Figure
3.1.
In general the approach is as follows: ﬁrst we need to identify the relevant
registers for the peripheral we want to investigate. If the peripheral is related to a
particular bus or has a controller that monitors operation there may be additional
registers to consider for analysis. It is best to start with all possible relevant registers
and then narrow down any that may not help with identifying faults related to the
interference that will be injected. Some of the registers will relate to identifying any
or all the devices connected on the bus and will contain information for them. For our
purposes, we are concerned with how the system’s processes that are related to the
device we connect change based on the interference. For this we focus on the registers
for that particular bus.
The bus registers will contain information indicating devices connected, where
in memory data is located, status for each device connected, and ﬂags for if the system
notices any irregularities in the data transmissions. This can possibly include invalid
data or an invalid number of bits in a packet. Next we need to devise a way to record
the information without impacting the performance of the system. This starts with
one approach for the SD card and then a diﬀerent, better approach used with the USD
peripheral.
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Figure 3.1: FriendlyARM Mini2440

Analyzing the data requires knowing what is expected in the registers during
operation without interference. It is important to have valid information regarding
the normal or expected operation of the system so that base states can be made.
These states can then be used as a reference for when interference is injected into the
system. The observed states diﬀerent from the base state in tests can be identiﬁed as
interference induced states. Further investigation into the new states should provide
useful ﬁndings to indicate reasons for the varied operation, or errors.

3.1 BACKGROUND
This section describes the background on the research and development of the
ESD software-based analysis from its origin in the work on the SD peripheral to the
advancement and expansion of the work in the fall of 2013. Work on the peripherals of embedded system began with investigations regarding the SD peripheral on the
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Friendly Arm mini2440 S3C2440 development board [25]. Initially, software applications, like Devmem, that would run on top of the system’s applications, were used to
record the data transfers [26]. This tool was limited on the rate at which it could
record values from the registers, potentially missing important information.

3.2 HARDWARE
The board that is used during the testing is the FriendlyArm Mini2440 embedded development board with the Samsung S3C2440 ARM9 processor [25]. The
USB host interface conforms to the Open Host Controller Interface speciﬁcations. A
custom-built Linux kernel, version 2.6.29, is used. This version is oﬀered from the
Friendly Arm website [25]. Connected to the board during test is a standard ﬂash
drive that stores a large ﬁle that is used to keep the communication on the bus active
during injection.
The ESD interference was injected using diﬀerent probes with a transmission
line pulse (TLP) generator. During injection the probe is held directly over the pins
with a constant pulse rate. Some of the probes used were electric (E) ﬁeld and magnetic
(H) ﬁeld. The E ﬁeld does not have an orientation; we position it across the USB port
or over the SD card. For each test with the E ﬁeld probe the voltage is adjusted in 500
volt increments per test to measure the variation in eﬀects on the system.
The H ﬁeld probe is used to create magnetic ﬁelds and has diﬀerent orientations
of interference with the system’s pins. The test is conducted with the probe in parallel
and perpendicular to the data and control lines. In addition, diﬀerent size probes were
used to adjust the intensity of the ﬁelds injected.
In addition to the use of a TLP, an ESD gun was used to generate stronger coupling interference by sending pulsed voltages directly to the ground plane underneath,
but not connected to the system.
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As seen in Figure 3.2, the board is actively transferring data over the USB bus
while ESD interference is injected on top of the pins. The probe used is a H Field High
ESD HX 5 probe injecting 3000 volts.

Figure 3.2: System Under Injection

3.3 SD PERIPHERAL
The experimentation of the oﬀ-the-shelf tools lead to conclusions of what our
ideal tool should encompass. We wanted a software implementation that could proﬁle
relevant registers and model the performance of the software on the system. Some of
the ideal characteristics for the tool are:
 Reconﬁgurable and ﬂexible with the registers that can be monitored.
 User friendly, portable, and cost eﬀective. The user should only need to indicate

a start and stop of the testing operation.
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 Highly repeatable and diagnostic capabilities.
 The capability to interface with data analysis applications, such as Matlab or

Microsoft Excel.
The tool that was developed for monitoring the SD peripheral is a data collection
program that runs in an interrupt driven mode on the processor. A hardware timer is
used to generate the interrupts periodically. The frequency is set high enough to allow
errors to be detected in the registers and allow the system’s applications (in this case
a minimalist program) run in near real time. In the event of the interrupt executing,
the program collects the designated register values and sends them to the connected
host PC via serial bus communication. A LabView program runs on the host PC to
log, display and analyze all data received.
This set up had ESD injected on the pins for SDDATA0, SDDATA1, SDDATA2,
SDDATA3, SDCMD, and SDCLK. To ensure that there was data communication,
read and write instructions were sent back and forth to the SD card. This will run
indeﬁnitely, resource permitting, or until the testing process is complete. The resulting
data is displayed in an analysis panel on the host PC. The panel contains information
for the state transitions, a command information table, error counts, pins used for test,
voltages used, and other statistics.
Continuous transmission of information from the DUT to the host PC limited
the sampling rate. Scanning through JTAG instead of UART would increase the effectiveness of the tool by reducing the CPU overhead. In the event of a system crash,
there was not a way to recover any information about the current state of the system.
There needed to be a way to store the information before it was sent to the host PC.
Another drawback was that the system did not have a running operating system. The
tool needs to be able to be implemented on a system that is implementing its intended
purpose, while interference is injected. It is unrealistic to strip a system of its normal
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operation to run tests. Having the system’s operating system actively running would
allow for real world simulation during testing.

3.4 USB PERIPHERAL
3.4.1 First Design.

In an attempt to create a tool that would work as well

as the SD method, but with a fully function system running, it was decided to add a
system driver to record register values. This USB host controller methodology involved
using a user level program, myregrw, which would continually instruct a module in
the system kernel to read speciﬁc registers. The program has a conﬁguration ﬁle
that indicates which registers to read from, enabling the ability to choose registers of
interest. This register reader module was intended to be a probe on the software side
instead of using a hardware probe invasively. The objective was to enable the ability to
determine the hardware state of subsystems from control and status registers. Exposing
the system to ESD would alter the values stored in the status registers. Noting these
changes in the software, it can be determined how the system was aﬀected by the
interference.
The ﬁrst step to conﬁgure the system for testing was to ensure the system
was running a Linux based operating system so that we could modify drivers. The
conﬁguration ﬁle for myregrw was then created, indicating to record all the control
and status registers between the addresses 0x49000000 and 0x49000014. The registers
in this window are for the USB host interface. Next the register reader kernel module
was inserted into the system along with the myregrw program. This completed system
preparation. ESD was injected similarly to the injection for the SD card and with the
registers being continuously sampled. The results were then recorded for later analysis.
Some of the possible error states for the register HcInterruptStatus that was monitored
can be seen in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: HcInterruptStatus Failure Modes
Value
0x00000001
0x00000010
0x00000020
0x00000030

Failure State

Comments
Hardware register value may change unexSchedulingOverrun
pectedly
System has experienced an unexpected erUnrecoverableError
ror
Hardware register value may change unexFrameNumberOverﬂow
pectedly
RootHubStatusChange Status change may be caused by ESD

If the module were able to read fast enough, ESD caused changes on the registers would be recorded and could later be used for analysis for why and what exactly
happened. However, the sampling rate of our softprobe was not suﬃcient to gather
ESD induced errors. Similar to some of the works mentioned in Section 2. by Callanan,
bottleneck issues prevented the methodology from performing reasonably. It was empirically determined that the sampling rate of the software is approximately 342 times
per second. With this we can assume the system executes one instruction per cycle and
in the worse case would reset a register value after one instruction. The Mini2440 has
a 400MHz clock. Thus

342
400∗106

∗ 100 = 0.000856% would be the worst case probability

of observing an error in the status register before it was changed. Considering this
low probability and the lack of information recorded, a new measurement methodology
that samples faster and records additional register values needed to be devised.
In addition to needing a faster sampling rate, this methodology must handle
Linux drivers modifying the control and status register values. By default, the Linux
drivers will also have execution priority over any user applications, meaning that it is
nearly impossible to read all the register values after an error and before the system
driver modiﬁes the registers.
3.4.2 Improved Design.

Due to sampling rate short comings in the ﬁrst

approach, investigation began to ﬁnd a way to increase the sampling rate and record
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additional information that could be used to determine when an ESD event occurs.
For this new approach, the drivers for the USB host controller were modiﬁed to enable
logging of the related registers. Figure 3.3 below shows the process of modifying the
drivers of the Linux kernel. To ease the process of loading variations of the drivers, the
drivers for the peripherals under study were built as kernel modules instead of being
part of the kernel. This requires loading the modules manually but allows for quick
modiﬁcation of the peripheral drivers instead of having to rebuild the entire system’s
kernel each time a modiﬁcation is made to the information recorded.
The driver modules are modiﬁed to log details of a software failure. This is
achieved by enabling the debug conﬁgurations that are readily available with most
drivers. It was determined that the debug conﬁguration did not provide suﬃcient
information to develop any conclusions. The driver is modiﬁed again to print register
values to the system log. We can consider this to be least invasive to the driver software
since it only requires trivial modiﬁcations. This additional information can now be used
to pinpoint the failure within the communication protocol and the hardware drivers.
3.4.3 Logging Information.

After the completion of the ﬁle transfer,

or abrupt end due to injected faults, the information recorded was copied to a text
ﬁle that was later analyzed. The registers that are recorded can be seen in the table
found in Appendix A with a brief description of each register’s purpose. There are two
diﬀerent types of information in them: information from the data structures in the
USB driver code, and execution paths through the driver.
Some data structures are mapped to speciﬁc memory addresses that are stored
in registers for the USB host controller. In the OHCI drivers, the struct ohci regs
deﬁnes these mapped registers. The host controller driver consists of several functions
that are called when certain events occur; for example, ohci irq is called when an
IRQ occurs for the host controller. Logging which function is being called gives a
rudimentary idea of the operational state of the hardware.

15

Figure 3.3: Driver Modiﬁcation Approach

The Registers in Appendix A have diﬀerent purposes that help determine the
condition of the communication between the system under test and the device connected via the USB bus. Later we further investigate the signiﬁcance of each register
and how each one individually can be used to observe diﬀerent transitions in the system
between the states based on those particular registers.
3.4.4 Software.

After gathering the information it is transferred to another

computer to be analyzed with Matlab scripts. The scripts break down the log ﬁles
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and create states that are used to determine when the system is in an ‘expected’ state
and when the system is in a fault state. A state is deﬁned by the values stored in
all of the registers recorded. For every sample (values from all registers of interest)
taken there will be another state created. Since a state is created for each sample it is
expected to have repeated states based on standard USB protocol. To enable analysis
and understanding of the operation of the system’s operation it will be necessary to
create a unique list of states. The code’s operation can be summarized as follows
 Parses the log ﬁle to create states based on the register information.
 Compares the list of states to create a list of unique states.
 Using a more generic list of states, generates a diﬀerent state graph to compare

observed base operation to the operation of a test.
 Using the unique list, creates a state graph of the operation, tracking the number

of times the system moves from one unique state to another.
 Compares the unique list of states with lists from other logs to observe which

states in the system were likely related to ESD.
3.4.5 Individual Log Files.

The ﬁrst stage in the analysis involves parsing

a log ﬁle for one simulation. The ﬁles are designed to contain a single register and its
corresponding value or a function name per line. From observation it was noted that
during operation, there were occasions where additional values for the top of the list of
registers were given before values for the rest. To accommodate for this event, a state
with incomplete data is created and the start of a new state is begun. This leads to
having two states that may not have values for all the expected registers. It can be
summarized that two adjacent states with incomplete information could be an ESD
event indicator.
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After creating all the states, the list of states is used to create a list of unique
states. By observation, provides a way to see how many diﬀerent states there are
during the system’s operation and to see how many times the system enters each state.
It is expected to have repeated states since the registers should be indicating repeated
values, showing normal operation. This shows normal operation because the register
values indicate system status, therefore should repeat. This list of unique states can
then be used to create a state machine for the system’s operation during observation.
Along with recording the unique set of states, the number of transitions between the
states is recorded. From this one can calculate the probability of diﬀerent transitions
occurring and determine why the system transitions to one error state instead of a
diﬀerent error state under the same stress conditions.
3.4.6 Universal States.

The unique list of states from each log can be used

to create a more generic set of states that encompasses every simulation. In order for
the states to be similar across simulations, any register referring to physical memory
addresses will have to be omitted since the addresses vary every time the driver is
restarted. Eliminating these registers in the deﬁnitions of the universal states allows
more trends and patterns to be observed between diﬀerent tests.
Next the universal set of states is used to compare which states are more commonly entered under diﬀerent conditions. This is applied in a few ways. To gain an
understanding on how the system varies between normal operation and operation with
ESD interference, two universal lists are created; one from logs that were not exposed
to ESD and one from logs that were. The two universal sets of states are subtracted
to determine which states only occur during ESD. These state sets can be used to
show where during operation the system transitioned into an ESD state. Figure 3.4
shows an example of a simpliﬁed base log state machine. Figure 3.5 shows an ESD
exposed log state machine. Note how Figure 3.5 has additional states due to the errors
that occurred during observation. The ﬁrst eight states in Figure 3.5 equivalent to the
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states in Figure 3.4. This shows that there are ﬁve ESD speciﬁc states in this system
during operation.
Multiple factors come into play when evaluating the eﬀects of ESD on the
system. As seen in Figure 3.6, trying to determine the likelihood of a transition to
an ESD state with respect to voltage levels only would prove a challenging task. It
is necessary to deﬁne a set of states that can be commonly found during every test
iteration.
Investigating further into the registers, it can be seen that some of the registers have information, indicating when the system has detected faults occurring during
communication. The registers that reveal the most information are HcControl, HcCommandStatus, HcInterruptStatus, HcInterruptEnable, and HcRhPortStatus0. The
values recorded for each and their signiﬁcance can be seen in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.
Individually they can indicate errors in the system and together they can be used to
gain better insight on the system’s condition.
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Figure 3.4: Simpliﬁed Base Log to Universal States

Figure 3.5: Simpliﬁed Error Log to Universal States
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Figure 3.6: Number of Transitions Between States in Error Logs
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3.5 THE REGISTERS

Table 3.2: HcInterruptStatus Register Values Recorded
Value
0x00000004
0x00000006
0x00000020
0x00000024
0x00000060
0x00000064
0x00000066

Meaning
Start of a frame
Update of Information
Unrecoverable Error Occurred
Starting new state and error
Frame overﬂow and unrecoverable error
Attempting to start new
frame despite errors
Attempting to update registers with errors

Comments
Indicates normal state
Indicates normal state
Need to investigate other
registers for more info
Possibly ESD induced
Good indicator of system
fault
System trying to recover
Another sign of potential recovery

The interrupt status register contains a few errors signals that can be seen
in Figure 3.2. There are three diﬀerent types of error recorded here that can assist
with describing the error that occurs during injection. Using these register values and
the HcPortStatus0 register values recorded in Figure 3.4, a better understanding of
the errors occurring can be gained. The port status register indicates diﬀerent types
of errors are being detected due to interference. From this it can be seen that the
system can already determine some types of errors. The frame errors can possibly be
caused by extra bits on the bus that are induced by ESD injection. It can also be seen
that the system will attempt to ignore some errors and try to recover by continuing to
transmit packets. During normal operation there are only seven variations to the values
recorded in the port status register, while there are fourteen diﬀerent values recorded
during ESD injection. This shows that we are successfully recording errors during the
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system’s operation while ESD interference is injected. Investigating the meanings of
the register values indicates that the system is faulting from diﬀerent errors, including
frame overloading, connection loss, corrupt data, and connection status changing.

Table 3.3: HcInterruptDisable Register Values Recorded
Value
0x8000005A
0x8000005E
0x8000001A
0x8000001E

Meaning
Frame overﬂow, Unrecoverable
Error
Frame overﬂow, Clears enable
register
Start of new frame
Starting new frame

Comments
Clears bits
Clears registers, sets start ﬂags
Normal information for a state
Normal operation

After the creation of the list of known deﬁned states, we can analyze the error
and normal operation logs individually to observe the number of occurrences the system
enters each state. This will allow us to see when the system enters one of the fault
induced states and the frequency. It is necessary to see the number of occurrences to
observe when the system corrects for the faults and when the system ultimately fails.
The analyzed results can then be compared to the physical observations and show
additional errors that could not be recorded visually.

3.6 MATLAB TOOL
The analysis tool is divided into smaller scripts to enable easy modiﬁcation when
identifying trends in the log ﬁles. To keep the tool as portable as possible, the scripts
have been designed to be generic with the exception of the names of the registers that
will be compared. Modiﬁcation or replacement of the list of registers to compare is all
that is needed to use the tool for a diﬀerent peripheral. The pseudo code in Figure 3.7
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Table 3.4: HcRhPortStatus0 Register Values Recorded
Value
0x00000103
0x00000101
0x00000100
0x00030100
0x00030101
0x00100103
0x00010100
0x00020101
0x00010101
0x00000111
0x00000113
0x00020103
0x00120101

Meaning
Comments
PortPowerStatus,
PortEnableStatus, CurrentConnected- Not an indication of an error
Status
Need to investigate other regisPortEnableStatus is disabled
ters for more info
Port has power no devices con- Shows there was a disturbance
nected
in connection
Turning power on to all ports
Possibly ESD induced
connection status changed
Frame overﬂow and unrecoverGood indicator of ESD
able error
Attempting to update registers
Sign of potential recovery
with errors
Attempting to start new frame
System trying to auto-ﬁx
despite errors
Change in portEnableStatus
Indicates normal state
Connect or disconnect occured Only occurred in error logs
Sign that ESD injection ﬂipped
Data set in reserved space
bits
Another sign of ESD injection
Data set in reserved space
ﬂipping data bits
Only occurred in ESD simulaIndicates connection reset
tions possibly ESD induced
The port connection reset comPortResetStatusChange
mand was sent

shows the overview of the steps needed to parse and analyze the logs to observe the
operation during test.
The operation starts with accessing the ﬁles created during test. These ﬁles are
individually parsed, creating an array of state objects to deﬁne the system’s operation
transitions. Each state contains a data value for each of the registers listed in Appendix
A. Upon completion of the individual state lists, the state lists are used to create a
generic list of states that all the ﬁles can reference to determine similar patterns. The
list needs the generalization due to physical memory addresses being referenced in
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some of the states. These values will be diﬀerent for each iteration of test and can be
ignored for creation of a generic list. This process occurs twice: once for all the logs
that were recorded during injection, and once for all the base simulations. This gives
us the option of comparing variations between tests with injection and tests without.
In order to have a list that can be referenced from both sets a new list of unique
states is created. This bigger list will start with all the states from the non-ESD
injected states and then add any states that are not already in the list. By doing this
we gain the ability to know which states only occur during ESD injection. The states
are numbered starting with the ﬁrst normal state and ending at the last ESD state.
The identiﬁer numbers can be used to create state graphs, showing how the system
transitioned between normal states and ESD states in the simulations. In addition to
using the larger list to create state graphs, we can compare the state transitions for
each log to determine the number of occurrences for each path. The varying levels
of intensity of injection can be observed and compared to each other to see when the
system faults more frequently and how early it experiences faults in the operation cycle.
The counts of all the transitions and number of each type of state are stored into an
Excel spreadsheet for later analysis and review if desired.

3.7 CLASSIFICATION PREDICTION
The list of the predeﬁned states allows us to create a list of potential known
states that a system will likely traverse. Using this set of states we can attempt to
deﬁne which states can be considered ESD and which are ‘normal’ operation, allowing
us to focus on predicting when the system is entering a fault. For this to be real time,
we will look at previous states to predict the likeliness that the current state is an error
state.
3.7.1 Training.

In order to predict whether a state will transition into

an ESD state or a normal state, the algorithm needs to review previous operations.
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Weights are selected to be within the range [−1, 1] such that a positive weight value
indicates an ESD-exposed state and a negative weight value indicates a non-ESDexposed state. They must compensate for the fact that the training data will contain
more logs from error operation than base operation. Weights are assigned as follows:
Let B and E be the lists of all base and error states, respectively.
Let the weight for base states wb = −|E| and for error states we = |B|.
For a unique state i, let bi be the number of times state i is present in B, and
ei be the number of times it is present in E.
For each unique state i, the normalized weight is deﬁned as:

wi =

wb ∗ bi + we ∗ ei
|wb ∗ bi | + |we ∗ ei |

which can also be written as

wi =

−|E| ∗ bi + |B| ∗ ei
|E| ∗ bi + |B| ∗ ei

The weights can be used to classify a log as follows:
Let SL be the set of unique states in log L, and si the number of times state i
appears in the log.

CL =

SL
∑
wi ∗ s i
i

|L|

If CL is positive, we classify the log as having experienced ESD, and if it is
negative, we classify it as having not experienced ESD.
3.7.2 Delta.

The delta parameter was introduced to prevent states that are

nearly equally present in base and error logs, prevents weights from being very close to
0. This will reduce ambiguity when classifying logs with more of the ambiguous states.
Weights are implemented as wb = −|E| − δ and we = |B| + δ.
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Thus the per-state weight can be written as

wi =

−|E| ∗ bi − δ ∗ bi + |B| ∗ ei + δ ∗ ei
|E| ∗ bi + δ ∗ bi + |B| ∗ ei + δ ∗ ei

The following graphs show performance on several diﬀerent training datasets for
diﬀerent values of delta. Figure 3.8 shows a sorted plot of unique weights; where the
dotted line is a straight line from -1 to 1. Figure 3.9 shows a plot of weights applied to
all of the data. Figure 3.10 plots the accuracy (black line), deviation from the dotted
straight line(red line), and the absolute value of the middle weight(blue line).
3.7.3 Scaling Before Normalization.

A modiﬁed approach to the delta

parameter is to multiply instead of using addition. Scaling before the normalization
gives the weights, wb = −|E| ∗ δ and we = |B| ∗ δ.
Thus the per-state weight can be written as

wi =

−|E| ∗ bi ∗ δ + |B| ∗ ei ∗ δ
|E| ∗ bi ∗ δ + |B| ∗ ei ∗ δ

Figure 3.11 show the performance of this approach. Note that the weights fall
into several of the same distributions instead of constantly varying as with the addition
of delta method.
3.7.4 Scaling After Normalization.

Scaling after normalizing is another

approach that has been taken to compare results. The base and error state weights are
as they were without delta: wb = −|E| and we = |B|. Per-state weights are normalized
and the scaled producing:

wi = (

−|E| ∗ bi ∗ δ + |B| ∗ ei ∗ δ
)∗δ
|E| ∗ bi ∗ δ + |B| ∗ ei ∗ δ

The graph in Figure 3.12 shows the performance of this approach. As expected,
the weights no longer fall into the [−1, 1] ranges. The classiﬁer does not see any
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performance change because the classiﬁer only uses the signs on the numbers and not
the magnitude to perform log classiﬁcation.
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function [ uniqueBase, uniqueError, tableBVal, tableEVal ] = main2(
baseDirectory, errorDirectory)
uniqueState = state;
[allLogBase, numLogsStatesBase] = getInfo(baseDirectory, 0, 0);
[numStateB, uniqueBase] = globalCompare(uniqueState, allLogBase);
[allLogError, numLogsStatesError] = getInfo(errorDirectory, 1, 0);
[numStateE, uniqueError] = globalCompare(uniqueState, allLogError);
globalCreatePathTree(uniqueBase, allLogBase, 'baseGraph');
globalCreatePathTree(uniqueError, allLogError, 'errorGraph');
comStateCount comGlobalState] = globalCompare(uniqueBase, uniqueError
);
globalCreatePathTree(comGlobalState, allLogBase, 'comBaseGraph');
globalCreatePathTree(comGlobalState, allLogError, 'comErrorGraph');
baseLogs = dir(baseDirectory);
baseLogs = baseLogs(3:end);
for i=1:length(baseLogs)
tempName = strcat(baseDirectory,'\',baseLogs(i,1).name);
temp = getSingleLog(tempName,0);
tableTmp = makeTransTable(comGlobalState, temp, size(uniqueBase
,2));
if i == 1
tableBVal = [tableTmp];
tableBName{i,1} = baseLogs(i,1).name;
else
tableBVal = [tableBVal; tableTmp];
tableBName{i,1} = baseLogs(i,1).name;
end
end
errorLogs = dir(errorDirectory);
errorLogs = errorLogs(3:end);
for i=1:length(errorLogs)
tempName = strcat(errorDirectory,'\',errorLogs(i,1).name);
temp = getSingleLog(tempName,0);
tableTmp = makeTransTable(comGlobalState, temp, size(uniqueBase
,2));
if i == 1
tableEVal = [tableTmp];
tableEName{i,1} = errorLogs(i,1).name ;
else
tableEVal = [tableEVal; tableTmp];
tableEName{i,1} = errorLogs(i,1).name;
end
end
xlswrite('logData',tableBName,'Sheet1','A2');
xlswrite('logData',tableBVal,'Sheet1','B2');
xlswrite('logData',tableEName,'Sheet2','A2');
xlswrite('logData',tableEVal,'Sheet2','B2');
end

Figure 3.7: Top Level Operation for the Tool
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Figure 3.8: Varying Weights of Delta

Figure 3.9: Weights of Delta
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Figure 3.10: Accuracy of Delta

Figure 3.11: Scaling Before Normalizing
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Figure 3.12: Scaling After Normalization
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4.

TESTING AND EVALUATION

Detecting and identifying the diﬀerent states are imperative to successfully determining both when a system experiences a fault and when that fault is related to
an ESD event. In this section, the recorded data is reviewed ﬁrst from a broad spectrum. The focus is then narrowed to investigate the individual registers for a deeper
understanding of the various values and their meanings.

4.1 ELECTRIC FIELD INJECTION
For this test, a board was placed in a laboratory setting, on a grounded plane.
The controlling computer was connected serially to instruct the device under test
(DUT) of the desired operations. This connection had coupling protection to ensure
that the shock did not carry through the cable, harming the host PC. After communication between the DUT and the host PC was established, instructions were sent to the
DUT to mount the USB module (see Listings 1. The drivers for the USB peripheral
were manually loaded, along with a manually mounted drive to copy data back and
forth. With a USB drive connected, the last command initialized the read and write
instructions between the board and the drive commence. The E ﬁeld EZ 3 probe was
used to inject interference on the USB connection. This probe was connected to a TLP
that generated interference at 2kV pulses every 0.25 seconds. The system failed within
ten seconds of injection.
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Listing 1: Mounting Instructions
$ insmod /lib/PATH LOCATION/core/usbcore.ko
$ insmod /lib/PATH LOCATION/host/ohci−hcd.ko
$ insmod /lib/PATH LOCATION/storage/usb−storage.ko
$ mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/usb
$ cp /mnt/usb/file /tmp

After the board was rebooted, the logged information was transferred to the
host PC. From here, the information was formatted to include only information from
this particular run. After the data was prepared, it was added to a directory so that
Matlab could run the comparison script with both it and all of the previous test cases.
An analysis of the Matlab ﬁle revealed that there were 221 states during operation and
57 unique sets of values within those states. Further investigation revealed there to be
16 unique error states. Several of those error states can be seen in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Error State Values Recorded
Register
HcControl
HcCommandStatus
HcInterruptStatus
HcInterruptEnable
HcInterruptDisable
HcFmInterval
HcPeriodicStart
HcLSThreshold
HcRhDescriptorA
HcRhDescriptorB
HcRhStatus
HcRhPortStatus0
HcRhPortStatus1

Error State
0x93
0x0
0x60
0x8000001a
0x8000001a
0xa7782edf
0x2a2f
0x628
0x2001202
0x0
0x8000
0x103
0x100

Error State
0x83
0x0
0x24
0x8000005a
0x8000005a
0xa7782edf
0x2a2f
0x628
0x2001202
0x0
0x8000
0x111
0x100

Error State
0x83
0x0
0x64
0x8000001e
0x8000001e
0xa7782edf
0x2a2f
0x628
0x2001202
0x0
0x8000
0x113
0x100

Error State
0xa3
0x0
0x20
0x8000005a
0x8000005a
0xa7782edf
0x2a2f
0x628
0x2001202
0x0
0x8000
0x103
0x100
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Variations in the errors were located in the following registers: operating mode
register, interrupt status, interrupt enable, interrupt disable, and port status 0. These
registers indicate that both overﬂow errors and unrecoverable errors occurred. The
occurrence of these errors indicates the system crashed as a result of data overﬂow.
Figure 4.1 contains all of the state occurrences from three diﬀerent logs. One
log is of a normal simulation. The next is manually disconnecting the ﬂash drive, and
the last is an ESD injected case. Manually viewing the information in the states reveals
that some of the states in the three logs have equivalent values in the registers and
can therefore be identiﬁed as normal operation states. This information indicates that
a device is connected and that data is communicating. The normal operation data in
Figure 4.1 suggests that the system completes a cycle until the end. The pulling the
drive out information shows how the system reacts when the device is simply removed.
This shows that the tool can also detect errors that are not the result of ESD. A
comparison of the three logs (see Figure 4.1) reﬂects what was experienced with the
150 diﬀerent simulations. The tool can identify states that exist only in the event of
ESD injection.
The additional states included in the error state list are clear indicators of more
serious faults that are caused by external interference. An observation of the transitions reveals that the system did maintain communication and that, despite errors, it
continued operation. The goal behind the method was to capture these events; visual
observation could not detect when they occurred. It was also noted that during the
test faults were not visually observed. This suggests that faults can be recorded that
cannot be observed when monitoring a system without the use of software instrumentation. Some of the faults were related to data that was added to the packets being sent,
creating confusion in the system. When this confusion occurred, the system would
send a request to resend the data packet. This need to retransmit the data reduced
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Figure 4.1: State Occurrences for Three Diﬀerent Types of Logs

the eﬃciency. It also explains why, during the test, the data transfer appeared to take
longer than expected.

4.2 MAGNETIC FIELD INJECTION
Magnetic ﬁeld injection requires the use of a diﬀerent probe. The rest of the
set up can be consistent to enable comparison between the diﬀerent ﬁeld aﬀects. The
DUT was programmed just as the OS had been programmed previously. The same
host PC was used to send instructions; the same ﬂash drive was used for consistency.
The observed results are summarized in Table 4.2. Injecting the ﬁelds both in parallel
and perpendicular generated the same results.
The H Field HX 5 probe was used ﬁrst. Because it did not generate errors at
higher voltages, an H Field HX 1T2 probe was added. Again however, errors could
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Table 4.2: H Field Results
Probe
H Field
H Field
H Field
H Field
H Field
H Field

High
High
High
High
High
High

ESD
ESD
ESD
ESD
ESD
ESD

HX
HX
HX
HX
HX
HX

5
5
5
5
5
5

Voltage
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000

Observed Result
No errors observed.
No errors observed.
No errors observed.
Read errors.
EMI messages.
Kernel Panic.

not be induced. An analysis of the results collected from the scripts conﬁrms that the
system was able to operate normally with smaller injections of interference.
The use of the High ESD HX 5 probe did induce errors, as seen in Table 4.2.
The voltage levels did, however, need to be increased to generate errors similar to those
experienced with the E ﬁeld probe. During E ﬁeld injection tests kernel panics could be
observed at as low as 3kV. For H ﬁeld injection the lowest voltage needed to experience
a kernel panic was 6kV.
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5.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

The goal of this research was to demonstrate a methodology that can eﬀectively
monitor an embedded system during operation. Later the work will be used to determine the eﬀects of electrostatic discharge. The literature review conducted revealed
that little work has been done to generate useful information. Although ESD interference may cause a system to fail, this research has shown that the system can continue
to be monitored and information can continue to be recorded.
The relationship between the recorded errors and ESD can be reversed. Doing
so allows predictions (based on errors the software experiences) to be made regarding
what pins have received ESD. As a result components that have received ESD can be
identiﬁed, either for replacement (if the goal of the experiment is to repair hardware)
or for improvement (if the goal is to reduce the eﬀects of ESD on a peripheral). Both
speciﬁc software errors and sequences of errors can be used to predict that the hardware has experienced ESD. With this information, software can be written to recover
from error states. This can possibly lead to not having to entirely disable and re-enable
the peripheral. Software may also be able to compensate for the eﬀects of ESD, allowing operation to continue in adverse environments (albeit at the cost of reduced
performance and more software overhead).
A better understanding of what can happen during an ESD event will prove
useful in the creation of defensive programming. A system can monitor the state
sequences during communication to predict not only whether or not an error state has
been reached but also how the system should react to attempt recovery without losing
any valuable information.
This work provides a stepping stone to many diﬀerent possibilities. It has
already been expanded to include the development of algorithms that can predict the
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likelihood of system failure before it occurs. Then the system can attempt to ﬁx issues
when they occur. Previous data can be utilized to help the algorithm teach itself
and then react when ESD interference takes place. Teaching the system to predict
possible faults sooner will greatly improve system reliability. The performance of the
Matlab analysis scripts could use evaluation for performance checking to improve the
computation time of post simulation results. Pursuing multi-threading and dividing
the work into more segments could prove useful when the data set grows.

APPENDIX A
UNIVERSAL SERIAL BUS REGISTERS

Table A1: USB Related Registers
Name
Operating Mode Register

HcCommandStatus

Command and Status Register

HcInterruptStatus

Interrupt and Status Register

HcInterruptEnable

Interrupt Enable Register

HcInterruptDisable
HcHCCA

Interrupt Disable Register
HCAA Address Register

HcPeriodCurrentED

Current Periodic Register

HcControlHeadED

Head Control Register

HcControlCurrentED

Current Control Register

HcBulkHeadED

Head Bulk Register

HcBulkCurrentED

Current Bulk Register

HcDoneHead
HcFmInterval
HcFmRemaining
HcFmNumber

Head Done Register
Frame Interval Register
Frame Remaining Register
Frame Number Register

HcPeriodicStart

Periodic Start Register

HcLSThreshold

Low-Speed Threshold Register

HcRhDescriptorA
HcRhDescriptorB
HcRhStatus

Root Hub A Register
Root Hub B Register
Root Hub Status Register

Definition
Controls the operating mode of the USB1.1 host controller
Shows the current state of the host controller and accepts commands from the host controller driver
Reports the status of the HCI interrupt sources
Enables various OHCI interrupt sources to generate interrupts
to the level 2 interrupt controller
Used to clear bits in the HC interrupt enable register
Deﬁnes the physical address of the HCCA
Deﬁnes the physical address of the next endpoint descriptor
(ED) on the periodic ED list
Deﬁnes the physical address of the head endpoint descriptor
(ED) on the control ED list
Deﬁnes the physical address of the next endpoint descriptor
(ED) on the control ED list
Deﬁnes the physical address of the head endpoint descriptor
(ED) on the bulk ED list
Deﬁnes the physical address of the next endpoint descriptor
(ED) on the bulk ED list
Physical address of the current head
Deﬁnes the number of 12-MHz clock pulses in each frame
Number of full-speed bit times remaining in the frame
Reports the current USB frame number
Deﬁnes the position within the USB frame where endpoint descriptors (EDs) on the periodic list have priority
Deﬁnes the latest time in a frame that the USB1.1 host controller
can begin a low-speed packet
Deﬁnes the USB host controller root hub functionality
Deﬁnes the USB host controller root hub functionality
Reports the USB host controller root hub status
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Register
HcControl

APPENDIX B
SECURE DIGITAL BUS REGISTERS
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Table B1: USB Related Registers
Register
SDIPRE
SDICARG
SDICCON
SDICSTA
SDIRSP0
SDIRSP1
SDIRSP2
SDIRSP3
SDIDTIMER
SDIBSIZE
SDIDCON
SDIDCNT
SDIDSTA
SDIFSTA
SDIIMSK

Name
Peripheral Clock
Command Arguments
the actual name
Command Status Register Flag
the actual name
the actual name
the actual name
the actual name
Timer Count
Block Size
Device Connection
the actual name
Status Clear Register
Stack Conﬁguration
Interrupt Mask
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